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This page brings together eleven competition law rulings that come up repeatedly in practice concerning merger control, foreign investment screening, abuse of a dominant market position, cartels and public procurement. The selection is deliberately narrow: it includes only rulings that are consistently cited both in the Commission's decisional practice and in the industry's own advisory work — not everything that is loosely related to the subject. The list is updated as new key rulings appear or one of those listed here loses its significance; the count is always checked at the same time.

Merger Control

Illumina/Grail (Joined Cases C-611/22 P and C-625/22 P)

In September 2024, the Court of Justice held that the Commission could not use the referral mechanism under Article 22 of the Merger Regulation to take up a transaction (the Illumina/Grail concentration) that did not meet any member state's national notification thresholds or the EU thresholds. The judgment annulled both the Commission's decision to take up the case and the fine it had imposed for breach of the standstill obligation, and it significantly limits the Commission's ability to address so-called "killer acquisitions" without support from national rules.

See also: The EU Merger Regulation and the One-Stop-Shop Principle, Fundamentals of Merger Control and the Notification Obligation

Tetra Laval v Commission (C-12/03 P)

In 2005 the Court of Justice confirmed that the Commission must be able to produce "convincing evidence" when prohibiting a merger on conglomerate-effect grounds, and that the General Court must be able to review such forward-looking economic analysis in full. The ruling established the evidentiary threshold and the intensity of judicial review that still apply in merger cases today, and it continues to be cited whenever the Commission's evidentiary requirements are discussed.

See also: Competition Law Assessment of Mergers and Remedies

Foreign Investment

Xella Magyarország (C-106/22)

In September 2023 the Court of Justice ruled that a member state cannot use its foreign investment screening mechanism to block the acquisition of a company controlled by an intra-EU investor from another member state, based solely on national interests (such as national food supply security), where the acquirer is in fact an intra-EU actor. The ruling limits the use of national FDI screening regimes in intra-EU transactions and stresses that derogating from the freedom of establishment requires a genuinely foreign, non-EU interest and compliance with the principle of proportionality.

See also: The EU FDI Screening Regulation and Cross-Border Cooperation, Screening of Foreign Acquisitions in Finland

Abuse of a Dominant Market Position

United Brands v Commission (27/76)

One of the foundational rulings on abuse of a dominant market position: in 1978 the Court confirmed the criteria for defining the relevant market (demand-side substitutability of the product — in this case, bananas as a separate fruit market) and set out the framework for when pricing can be regarded as unfairly high and therefore an abuse. The ruling remains the standard reference for relevant market definition and excessive pricing cases.

See also: Relevant Markets, Dominant Market Position

Hoffmann-La Roche v Commission (85/76)

The 1979 judgment defined the concept of a dominant market position ("a position of economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking which enables it to prevent effective competition being maintained") and established that fidelity rebates and exclusive purchasing obligations are, in principle, abusive because they tie the buyer to a single supplier without objective justification. The ruling remains the starting point for defining dominance and for assessing rebate schemes.

See also: Abuse of a Dominant Market Position, Dominant Market Position

AKZO Chemie v Commission (62/86)

In 1991 the Court confirmed the so-called AKZO test for predatory pricing: pricing below average variable cost is, in principle, abusive without separate proof of an intent to eliminate a competitor, while pricing between average variable and average total cost additionally requires evidence of an intention to eliminate a competitor. The test remains the foundation for assessing predatory pricing, although the Intel case law has since supplemented it with the as-efficient-competitor analysis.

See also: Abuse of a Dominant Market Position

Intel v Commission (C-413/14 P and C-240/22 P)

In its 2017 judgment, the Court of Justice clarified that rebates tied to exclusive purchasing obligations may also require the application of the as-efficient-competitor (AEC) test where the undertaking submits evidence that the rebate scheme was not capable of restricting competition; the case was referred back to the General Court for that assessment. In January 2022 the General Court annulled the entire €1.06 billion fine, because the Commission's AEC analysis did not meet the required standard of sufficiently precise and consistent reasoning. The Commission appealed that judgment, but in its final judgment of 24 October 2024 (C-240/22 P) the Court of Justice dismissed the Commission's appeal in its entirety, making the annulment of the fine final. These rulings have reshaped EU case law on rebate schemes and exclusionary pricing throughout the 2020s.

See also: Abuse of a Dominant Market Position

Cartels and Sanctions

Cartes Bancaires v Commission (C-67/13 P)

In 2014 the Court of Justice narrowed the circumstances in which an agreement can be regarded as restricting competition "by object" without a separate showing of market effects: the by-object classification must be reserved for agreements that are, by their nature, sufficiently harmful to competition in light of experience and economic theory, and it must not be interpreted broadly. The ruling is a key reference whenever an arrangement between competitors is assessed for whether it can be classified as a by-object restriction without an effects analysis.

See also: Cartels and Horizontal Restrictions of Competition, Information Exchange Between Competitors

Akzo Nobel v Commission (C-97/08 P)

In 2009 the Court of Justice confirmed the rebuttable presumption that a parent company wholly owning its subsidiary exercises decisive influence over the subsidiary's commercial conduct and can therefore be held jointly and severally liable for the subsidiary's competition infringement without separate proof of actual involvement. The presumption remains a standard tool used by the Commission and national competition authorities to establish parent-company liability within corporate groups.

See also: Fines in Competition Law

Enforcement and Damages

City of Vantaa v Skanska Industrial Solutions and Others (C-724/17)

In a damages action stemming from Finland's early-2000s asphalt cartel, the Supreme Court asked the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling on who can be held liable for the harm caused by a cartel where some of the companies that took part in it had ceased to exist as a result of corporate reorganisations. The judgment, delivered in March 2019, confirmed that liability for damages based on an infringement of Article 101 TFEU is determined by EU law's concept of an "undertaking," not by national company law: under the principle of economic continuity, liability can therefore transfer to a company that has continued the economic activity of the company that committed the infringement, even where it is, formally, a different legal person. The Supreme Court applied the ruling in its national judgment KKO:2019:90. The ruling is one of the most cited in EU private enforcement generally, and it originated specifically from a Finnish court case.

See also: Private Damages Claims in Competition Law, Cartels and Horizontal Restrictions of Competition

Public Procurement

Teckal Srl v Comune di Viano (C-107/98)

In 1999 the Court established the so-called Teckal criteria, under which a contracting authority may award a contract without a competitive tender to a formally separate entity that is, in substance, treated as an "in-house" body: this requires that the contracting authority exercises control over the entity similar to that which it exercises over its own departments, and that the entity carries out the essential part of its activities with the contracting authority. The criteria remain the starting point on which the current in-house exemption in the procurement directives — including the in-house exemption under Finland's Procurement Act — is based.

See also: Fundamentals of Public Procurement and Its Interface with Competition Law

Sources

Lainsäädäntö ja lähteet tarkistettu 6.9.2026.