Seuraamusmaksut kilpailuoikeudessa/EN

Suomeksi

The fine imposed for a restriction of competition in Finland is an administrative fine confirmed by the Market Court on a proposal from the Finnish Competition and Consumer Authority (FCCA); the basis for calculating it was substantially reformed as part of the implementation of the ECN+ Directive.

Avainkohdat

• Mistä on kyse: A fine may amount to no more than 10% of the worldwide turnover of the company's entire group (or, more broadly defined, the group of undertakings).
• Miksi sillä on kaupallista merkitystä: The calculation formula is now more transparent and predictable than before, which makes it easier to assess risk already at the compliance stage and in the profitability calculation for a possible leniency application.
• Mikä menee useimmin pieleen: The maximum amount is calculated on the turnover of the entire group, not just the turnover of the individual subsidiary that participated in the infringement — parent-company liability may also become relevant through the turnover cap.

Calculation Model

The calculation of the fine is based on sections 13a–13f of the Competition Act and proceeds in stages:

1. Starting point for the basic amount (Section 13b) — calculated on no more than 30% of the turnover accrued from the sale of the goods or services related to the infringement during the last calendar year in which the company participated in the infringement. For price and market-sharing cartels and for output restrictions, the proportion taken into account must exceed 15%, unless special reasons dictate otherwise.
2. Duration (Section 13c) — the proportion calculated above is multiplied by the duration of participation in the infringement in years; periods of less than six months are counted as half a year.
3. Severity increase (Section 13d) — irrespective of the duration of the infringement, an additional 15–25% of the turnover referred to in Section 13b is added to the basic amount for the most serious infringements, in order to achieve a sufficiently deterrent effect.
4. Adjustments (Section 13e) — the basic amount calculated above may be increased on the basis of aggravating factors (e.g. repetition or continuation of the infringement after the authority has intervened, the role of a leader or instigator, or pressuring others to participate) or reduced on the basis of mitigating factors (e.g. a settlement, immediate termination of the infringement, a markedly minor role, cooperation with the FCCA going beyond the statutory minimum, or approval given by an authority for the conduct).
5. Ability to pay (Section 13f) — for special reasons and at the undertaking's request, the amount of the fine may take into account the undertaking's inability to pay under specific social and economic circumstances. A reduction requires objective evidence that imposing the fine would inevitably jeopardise the viability of the undertaking and render its assets worthless.
6. Maximum amount (Section 13a) — the final result may never exceed 10% of the worldwide total turnover of the undertaking (or group of undertakings). This ceiling is calculated on the turnover of the financial year preceding the FCCA's proposal for a fine or the Market Court's/Supreme Administrative Court's decision on the fine — not the turnover of the year the infringement ended, which is worth noting particularly in protracted proceedings.

Procedure

The FCCA does not itself impose the fine; instead it makes a proposal to the Market Court, which confirms the amount of the fine. This two-tier procedure differs from the EU level, where the European Commission imposes the fine directly.

Käytännön huomio

Because the order of magnitude of the fine risk can already be assessed at an early stage on the basis of the calculation model, it is worth factoring into both the profitability assessment of a leniency application and any settlement negotiations with the FCCA.

Reduction in Cases Other than Cartels (Section 18)

The leniency programme (Sections 14–17b; see Immunity from and Reduction of Fines (the Leniency Programme)) applies only to secret cartels between competitors. For other types of infringement — for example abuse of a dominant market position (Section 7) or arrangements other than those between competitors — a separate, discretionary reduction option exists: the FCCA may propose a smaller fine or refrain from making a proposal altogether if the undertaking has materially assisted in investigating the restriction of competition; correspondingly, the Market Court may impose a smaller fine or refrain from imposing one. Unlike the leniency programme under Sections 14–17b, Section 18 does not create an entitlement for the undertaking when certain conditions are met; it rests purely on the discretion of the FCCA and the Market Court.

Limitation Period (Section 19)

A fine may not be imposed for an infringement of Section 5, 7, 25 or 27, or of Article 101 or 102 TFEU, unless a proposal has been submitted to the Market Court within five years of the infringement occurring (or, for a continuing infringement, of its ending); the FCCA's own investigative measures restart the running of this period from the beginning. A parallel EU investigation (by the Commission or the authority of another Member State) suspends — rather than restarts — the running of the limitation period for all parties involved. The absolute, uninterrupted maximum period is ten years from the infringement (or its ending), regardless of how many times the five-year period has been restarted.

Käytännön huomio

The limitation period concerns the submission of the fine proposal to the Market Court — not the commencement of the investigation into the infringement itself. In a protracted FCCA investigation, it is worth tracking both the five-year (interruptible) and the ten-year (absolute) limits separately, since the FCCA's own measures can significantly extend the practical overall duration within the bounds of the five-year limit.

Parent-Company Liability

In competition law, liability for an infringement attaches to a single economic unit, not to a formal legal entity — this makes it possible to extend the fine (and liability for damages) to the parent company, even if only a subsidiary in fact committed the infringement.

Where a parent company owns (almost) the entire capital of a subsidiary, a rebuttable presumption applies whereby the parent company exercises decisive influence over the subsidiary's market conduct — the parent company and the subsidiary are then regarded as forming a single economic unit and as being jointly and severally liable for the fine, unless the parent company can demonstrate that the subsidiary acted independently on the market. Liability may also extend through economic succession, for example in corporate transactions where the business that committed the infringement has been transferred to a new owner.

The Court of Justice has further confirmed that the same single-economic-unit doctrine also operates in reverse: a party that has suffered harm may, in a damages action, direct its claim against the subsidiary instead of, or alongside, the parent company, where they form a single economic unit.

Käytännön huomio

Parent-company liability is a key checkpoint in due diligence for mergers and acquisitions and for group structures: past competition law infringements of the target company (or its subsidiaries) may pass to the buyer through economic succession, and the parent company's own liability for a subsidiary's past infringements may still become relevant even after closing.

See Also

• The FCCA's Investigative Powers and Dawn Raids
• Immunity from and Reduction of Fines (the Leniency Programme)
• Appeals in Competition Matters

Sources

Lainsäädäntö ja lähteet tarkistettu 6.9.2026.