Kartellit ja horisontaaliset kilpailunrajoitukset/EN

Suomeksi

Cartels and other horizontal (between-competitor) restrictions of competition are regarded as among the most serious infringements of competition law, and they regularly attract significant fines.

Avainkohdat

• Mistä on kyse: A cartel is an agreement or concerted practice between competitors aimed at restricting competition — most typically by agreeing on prices, dividing markets or customers, or rigging bids.
• Miksi sillä on kaupallista merkitystä: The most serious forms of cartel (hardcore restrictions) are prohibited by object (by object), and their actual effects on the market need not be separately demonstrated — this significantly lowers the evidentiary threshold for the authority.
• Mikä menee useimmin pieleen: A cartel does not require a formal agreement: the mere exchange of sensitive information between competitors concerning future pricing or market conduct can, by itself, already be sufficient to constitute a prohibited concerted practice.

Prohibited Horizontal Restrictions

Section 5 5 § of the Competition Act (corresponding in substance to Article 101(1) TFEU) prohibits agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings, and concerted practices which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition. Of the prohibition's three forms, the concerted practice has the widest scope: under the Court of Justice's settled definition, it refers to a form of coordination between undertakings which, without having reached the stage where an agreement properly so-called has been concluded, knowingly substitutes practical cooperation between them for the risks of competition. The following so-called hardcore restrictions are regarded as particularly serious:

• price-fixing cartels — agreeing on selling or purchase prices, or components thereof;
• market or customer allocation — dividing territories, customer groups or supply volumes among competitors;
• bid rigging — agreeing in advance on the content or winner of bids in public or private tender procedures; and
• output restrictions.

These are regarded as anticompetitive by their very object (by object), meaning their actual market effects need not be separately demonstrated. According to the Court of Justice, the concept of a restriction by object must be interpreted narrowly: it can be applied only to coordination between undertakings which reveals a sufficient degree of harm to competition that there is no need to examine its effects separately — precisely price-fixing, market or customer allocation, and output restrictions are the examples established in case law of such restrictions. Restrictions that do not reach this threshold may still be prohibited, but in that case their anticompetitive nature must be demonstrated separately on the basis of actual or likely market effects (by effect), which requires considerably more extensive economic and legal evidence than an assessment by object.

Example from Finnish Case Law: The Asphalt Cartel

The largest cartel case handled in Finland to date is the so-called asphalt cartel, in which seven asphalt companies, between 1994 and 2002, divided asphalt-paving contracts commissioned by private parties, municipalities and the state across the entire country by region and customer group, agreed on the content of bids in advance, and restricted each participant's annual supply volumes — in other words, implemented in practice all of the hardcore restriction types listed above simultaneously. In its judgment of 29 September 2009 (issued under the then-applicable Act on Restrictions of Competition, 480/1992), the Supreme Administrative Court confirmed fines totalling approximately EUR 82.4 million against the companies, of which by far the largest, approximately EUR 68 million, was imposed on Lemminkäinen as the leading participant in the cartel. The fine decision was followed by years of private-law damages litigation, in which the municipalities and the state that had been within the cartel's sphere of activity sought compensation for the overcharges they had paid for the contracts; see Private Damages Claims in Competition Law.

The Special Position of Trade Associations

Competition law risk also concerns the activities of trade associations: the exchange of statistics, common recommended prices or terms, and joint positions on market conduct can constitute a prohibited restriction of competition, even where the activity takes place within the ostensibly neutral framework of association activities.

Käytännön huomio

When planning a client's trade association activities, it is always worth clearly distinguishing permitted cooperation (e.g. general industry statistics, joint advocacy) from prohibited information exchange — the line is often a fine one, and it is worth paying attention to it already when drafting meeting materials.

Sanctions

Cartels in Finland are subject to an administrative fine (Competition Act, section 12), which the Market Court confirms on a proposal from the FCCA. Participating in a cartel is not, in Finland, a criminal offence, unlike in several other countries, but participation can nevertheless lead to significant financial sanctions as well as private-law liability in damages; see Fines in Competition Law and Private Damages Claims in Competition Law.

See Also

• Exemption from the Prohibition of Restrictive Agreements
• Information Exchange Between Competitors
• Immunity from and Reduction of Fines (the Leniency Programme)
• The FCCA's Investigative Powers and Dawn Raids
• Vertical Agreements and Block Exemption Regulations

Sources

Lainsäädäntö ja lähteet tarkistettu 12.9.2026.